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As major weapons systems become more complex, it becomes increasingly
more difficult to accurately estimate the cost. Various costing techniques
have been utilized in an attempt to accurately estimate the contract price
of modern weapon systems with varying degrees of success. "Should cost"
analysis has become increasingly more important, in the eyes of some, as
the best approach in a noncompetitive procurement situation.
Currently, the Army, the Air Force, the Navy and GAO all conduct
"should cost" studies using various approaches. In this paper, an attempt
is made to gain the feelings of Defense contractors concerning the appli-
cation of Government "should cost" analysis. The author of this paper has
made several recommendations, based upon data available, concerning the
limitations of and the application of "should cost" analysis.
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At no other peace time period in the world's history has the need for
proper allocation and effective utilization of resources been more critical
than it is at present. The nations of the world are currently all too
aware of the need to successfully manage petroleum products and some areas
have a more critical problem in shortages of such essentials as paper prod-
ucts. Maximum utilization of resources pervades our national policy, espe-
cially in the Department of Defense.
Within the Department of Defense (DOD), resources can be broadly defined
by three categories: manpower, material, and money. Although all three of
these categories are of major importance (i.e., the reduction in the man-
power levels of the Armed Forces, shortages of essential raw materials, and
close scrutinization of the spending of the Defense dollar), only the effec-
tive use of procurement dollars in acquiring weapons systems will be addressed
in this paper. It must be realized that manpower and material are highly
dependent on money, the third resource, and that effective use of procure-
ment dollars must anticipate manpower and material needs. However, the
scope of this paper will be limited to dealing solely with procurement
dollars as used in acquiring major weapons systems.
Although the procurement dollars of the Defense budget have been rela-
tively stable for the past few years, the increases in military pay, allow-
ances, and retired pay are taking a much larger portion. Figure I shows a
graphical comparison of military and retired pay, procurement, and research,
development, test and evaluation estimated obligated authority for the
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A stable procurement budget impacted by inflation (nearly 9% for the calen-
dar year 1973) decreases the purchasing power and it is therefore necessary
for DOD to make every effort to effectively utilize the procurement dollars
that are available.
The unpopularity of the Viet Nam Far and a shift in national priorities
mean DOD can no longer spend its appropriations without the close scrutiny
of the Congress and the criticism of the general public. Because of such
critics of Defense spending as Senator William Proxmire (Report from Waste-
land; America's Military-Industrial Complex ) and A. Ernest Fitzgerald
(The High Priests of Waste ) , the general public is aware of recent cost
growth of weapons systems. Some people, as pointed out by The Commission
on Government Procurement (Ref. 6), feel that some of the national budget
that is currently being spent by DOD should be applied to pressing social-
economic problems. It is therefore necessary for DOD and all Government
agencies to effectively utilize the taxpayers' dollar by improved cost
estimating.
B. THE PROBLEM
As the complexity of today's weapons systems increases, it becomes more
difficult to accurately estimate their costs, especially in the early devel-
opment stages. Faulty cost estimates, coupled with inflation, are blamed
as causing numerous projects to experience tremendous cost growth. Repre-
sentative Les Aspin (Democrat-Wisconsin) reported (Ref. 22) that the costs
for the current 47 major weapons projects (see Table I) had been estimated
at $110.9 billion, but actual costs will be $131.9 billion. He added that
"we pay more and more and get less and less in real defense." Caution must
be observed when reacting to such statements as that of Aspin because it is
necessary to know what baseline is being used in the determination that a

Distribution of Cost Growth for Major Weapons Systems as of September 30,
1973 ($ in Millions)
WEAPONS SYSTEM GROWTH WEAPONS SYSTEM GROWTH
ARMY NAVY
LANCE (Battalions) $ 129 A-7E $1,058
Imp. HAWK (Battery Sets) 298 AV-8A -
SAFEGUARD (Sites) 2,046 E-2C 290
SAM-D (Tac. Fire Sec.) - 324 F-14A 1,227
HLH (Componet Dev.) - P-3C 224
UTTAS 58 S-3A 442
MICV 7 AEGIS (R&D only) 56
ARSV (SCOUT) 1 CONDOR 233
AAH 11 HARPOON 28
XM-1 1 PHOENIX 561
POSEIDON 348
AIR FORCE SIDEWINDER AIM-9L 10
A-7D 263 SPARROW IIIF 547
A-10 - MK-48 MOD 1 236
B-l 2,487 SSN-668 570
C-5A 1,742 DD-963 224
F-5E 12 DLGN-38 14
F-15 503 LHA 241
F-lll 4,053 PF -
AWACS - 276 PHM 1
AABNCP - CVAN-68 Class 274











Source: Federal Contracts Report (No. 515) 28 January 1974
TABLE I

cost growth exists. In a report to the House Committee on Armed Services
(Ref. 33), the General Accounting Office (GAO) pointed out that there are
three major causes of cost growth: inflation accounts for 30%, changes in
requirement about 45%, and 25% is attributed to estimating errors. These
figures seem to be somewhat in contradiction as it is difficult to believe
that accurate estimates can be made when the requirements are not certain.
The question that must be asked is that if the requirements change, was
the estimate faulty or was the estimate right for that for which it was
made. Effective use of the correct estimating technique in the right pro-
curement situation can be used to protect the Government and the taxpayer
against unnecessary future cost growth.
The present day arsenal of cost estimating includes, but is not limited
to the following:
1. The historic method where the estimate is based on previous procure-
ments of similar items;
2. The engineering or building block approach which entails an exami-
nation of separate items of work at a low level of the work breakdown structure
with detailed estimates developed for functional costs of engineering,
manufacturing, quality control, etc., which are in turn broken down by
labor, material, and other elements of cost for each item;
3. The parametric costing technique predicts costs by means of explan-
atory variables such as performance characteristics, physical characteristics,
^OD Instruction 7000.2 dated December 22, 1967, defines the work break-
down structure as a product-oriented family tree division of hardware,
software, services and other work tasks which organizes, defines, and
graphically displays the product to be produced as well as the work to be
accomplished in order to achieve the specified product.
^See page 173, Ref. 1 for additional information.

and characteristics relevant to the development process as derived from
3
experience on logically related systems, and
4. The "should cost" or industrial engineering approach which consists
of a team effort to determine the amount that weapons systems (or other
major items) ought to cost given attainable efficiency and economy of oper-
ations. It could be inferred that in an effort to determine a fair and
reasonable price that a determination be made for each procurement of what
the item should cost by whatever means considered available.
Each of the various costing techniques is appropriate for certain types
of procurements, but it is felt by many, especially the Army and the Air Force,
that for major complex weapons systems procured under a noncompetitive situ-
ation, "should cost" is the best approach. A problem with this type of
attitude is that "should cost" is highly product oriented and has little or
no justified application during the early stages of the system life cycle
when the requirements are not yet certain. Some of the basic problems
with the "should cost" approach are that it is time consuming, disruptive
of contractor operations, and many contractors feel that it interferes with
their management prerogatives. Contractors dislike a Government team in-
specting their plant, tying up operations for months, and then telling them
how they ought to run their business. So it would be advantageous, to both
the Government and industry, if it were not necessary for the Government to
conduct "should cost" studies. In the words of Gordon Rule (Ref. 24),
"... a 'should cost' study conducted by the Government is, in essence, the
Government having to do something that the contractor should do for himself."
The author's concern for cost estimating raised several questions:





situations and, .if not, when is it most applicable; (2) is industry in favor
of "should cost" and, if not, how could they be "turned on" to the technique;
and (3) what qualitative and quantitative techniques comprise a "should cost"
study. This paper is aimed at answering these and other questions, updating
the literature as to the attitudes of the services, GAO, and industry rela-
tive to "should cost." Additionally, it tests industry's attitude toward
the recommendations of the Commission on Government Procurement, and, in




Three basic techniques of research and data collection were used for
information contained in this paper. Literary research was used extensively
for background information, the current policies and attitudes of the Gov-
ernment agencies and industry, and the techniques of the "should cost" study
itself. Personal interviews were conducted with various prominent and
knowledgeable individuals, both in industry and DOD. The criteria for select-
ing interview candidates included selection of people who were no lower than
the third level of the corporate structure, but still directly involved with
product pricing. Candidates were about equally split with contractors who
did predominantly Government business and those who did little Government
trade. Appendix A contains the basic questions used in the interviews, but
it must be understood that these questions were used only to stimulate the
conversation and the interviews were not limited to these question areas.
Based upon the literary research and the data gained through interviews,
recommendations have been made.
D. THESIS OUTLINE
Chapter one of this paper contains basic introductory information, the
statement of the problem to be addressed, and the methodology used to gain
11

information toward the possible solution of the problem. Chapter two con-
tains information concerning the actual methods of conducting a "should
cost" study; the planning and scheduling involved and a brief presentation
of some of the methods employed. The third chapter deals with the attitudes
of the services, GAO, and industry concerning "should cost" studies. Chap-
ter four contains a summary of the data, and the fifth, and final, chapter
contains a summary and recommendations.
12

CHAPTER II "SHOULD COST" ANALYSIS
A. WHAT IS "SHOULD COST"?
"Should cost" is the determination of the amount that a product ought
to cost, not will cost, based on attainable efficiency and economy of oper-
ations. This amount is obtained through a very detailed industrial manage-
ment study which examines all phases of a contractor's manufacturing process,
managerial capabilities, and his financial situation. The "should cost"
review has as its objectives the identification, selection and implementa-
tion of improvements in a contractor's method of managing and operating his
business thereby leading to increased efficiency and economy of operation.
The review consists of an in-depth look at not only historical data, but a
thorough look at the contractor's facilities and tooling, its manufacturing
capabilities, and assembly lines, the working interface between various plant
operations. A "should cost" review considers all activity in a contractor's
plant and is not directed at one program or product.
Care must be taken to distinguish between "should cost" and Government
"should cost" analysis. Every efficient contractor conducts, in essence,
"should cost" every time that he prices an item. In the view of some con-
tractors, a Government "should cost" study involves a Government team,
either independent consultants or DOD employees, invading the contractor's
plant and disrupting operations for a long period of time in an attempt to
arrive at a negotiation position or in support of an earlier position. This
approach, when used by the Government, is not to be viewed as a cure-all to
all cost growth problems, but as a potent analytical tool for use in
Ref. 13 has a detailed description of the "should cost" concept.
13

appropriate cases. The objective of "should cost" should be the negotiation
of a "fair and reasonable" price; attempts to negotiate "ideal" prices are
officially eschewed.
The appropriate timing for the application of "should cost" is a matter
of discussion, but since the technique is highly product oriented it is sug-
gested that it becomes more justified as the product advances through the
system life cycle and the number of uncertainties decreases. Figure II is
a graphical interpretation of the degree of applicability as a function of
uncertainty. Intentionally, the axes have no scale and no exact relation-
ship is intended.
-
B. THE "SHOULD COST" REVIEW
The exact techniques of data collection in a "should cost" analysis are
unique to the review to be conducted. Because of this uniqueness in methods,
the impetus of this section will be the planning and scheduling involved in
such a study. Although each of the Government agencies have different
approaches toward "should cost," there are several items in common. Lange
(Ref. 18) points out six basic phases of a "should cost" review.
1. Phase 1: Preparatory Efforts
This phase is conducted off-site and is by far the most important
phase of the "should cost" event schedule. The first step in this phase is
the selection of a candidate for a "should cost" review. Some of the items
to be considered in the selection of a cnadidate are:
a. Lack of price competition - in advertised procurements, or
negotiated procurements in which genuine competition exists, it is generally
assumed that objective or realistic prices are obtained by the forces of the
market place. Competition does not necessarily rule out the use of "should
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one price quotation is drastically lower than other bids which may indicate
a buy-in. In such situations, the technique can be used to assure that the
contractors are putting forth a realistic cost basis upon which the contract
award can be based.
b. Percentage of Government business - if the contractor does very
little Government business, he will be forced to be efficient by the pres-
sures of the competitive market. It may be assumed that this efficiency will
carry over into the Government business, but this assumption is not justi-
fied if his work is predominantly Governmental.
c. Probability of follow-on business - "should cost" studies have
both short-term and long-term benefits. In the short run, the Government
has an initial negotiation position. In the long run, the contractor applies
the recommendations of the study group and becomes more efficient in all of
his operations and the Government will benefit by doing future business with
the contractor. It is appropriate to point out that the original "should
cost" study was completed during the performance of one contract (Pratt and
Whitney) in order to ascertain what the next incremental quantity of produc-
tion items should cost. It is possible that this could have been determined
by means other than "should cost," but this was the decision at that time.
d. Sufficient time to complete the "should cost" analysis before
negotiations - to be effective, the study must be thoroughly planned and
completely administered. Without sufficient time, the study would have to
be hurried or abbreviated and the results of the study would be questionable.
e. Procurement expected to be of a high dollar value - the Govern-
ment must believe that the expected benefits derived by the study will be
worth the expense encountered in conducting a "should cost" study.
f. Required special skills are available to the team - depending
on the activities of the contractor, special skills such as industrial
16

engineers, procurement specialists, statisticians, legal personnel, and
accountants may be required to properly evaluate the operations. Such
personnel must be available for the long period of time required to conduct
the study.
g. Previous business experience - a "should cost" review may be
warranted if a sole producer has experienced precipitous and unsubstantiated
increases in costs and is projecting substantial additional increases.
Lange (Ref. 18) suggests a check list for selecting "should cost" can-
didates. (See Table II). Several items on this check list can easily be
challenged. As mentioned earlier, the degree of certainty is a very impor-
tant factor in determining if a "should cost" study if appropriate and it
is believed that the factor concerning technical, quantity, -and schedule
changes should be a go/no go factor.
Once that it has been determined that a "should cost" analysis is needed,
the next step in the preparatory phase is the selection of team leaders and
members. The size and composition of the team must be suited to fit the
magnitude and complexity of the "should cost" task. The U.S. Army Logistics
Management Center has printed a document (Ref. 19) which describes four dif-
ferent approaches to the team size and composition. Objectivity of the
study can best be achieved by selecting the team leadership from outside the
activity responsible for the negotiations. With the chief negotiator on the
team, the contractor may become very defensive and cooperation would be
lacking. Continuity of the study is also desired and this is best accom-
plished by having the team leaders remain as such throughout negotiations,
thus being able to defend their own, rather than someone else's position.
There is a delicate balance between objectivity and continuity; therefore,
the selection of team leaders and members is instrumental in the degree of
success of the "should cost" study.
17

SUGGESTED "SHOULD COST" RATINGS FOR CANDIDATE CONTRACTORS
A. Go/No Go Considerations
1. Lack of adequate price competition
2. Sufficient time to complete "Should Cost" analysis
3. Procurement exceeds dollar value
4. Required special skills available
5. Tasks sufficiently well-defined
B. Weighted Considerations
1. Potential for significant follow-on business
2. Known or suspected specific problems to be solved or reduced
3. History of increasing costs, or improvements needed in cost
controls
4. Probability of shifting cost risk to contractor by improving
contract type or cost-incentive sharing arrangement
5. Preponderance of Government business
6. Probability that "should cost" benefits will extend into other
effort (e.g., development to production, other programs, etc.)
7. Existence of a good base of historical data to benefit the "should
cost" analysis
8. Manufacturing conditions not likely to change
9. Program not subject to excessive technical, quantity or schedule
change
10. Lack of confidence in current cost estimates
11. Government will have strong bargaining position
12. Potential for improvement in contractor's efficiency of manufactur-
ing operations
13. Other factors (As appropriate)
SOURCE: Gunther Lange, Should Cost Lessons Learned , U.S. Army




The final step in the preparatory phase consists of having the team
leaders assemble at the plant as a preplanning group. This allows a small
group to review the overall plant layout, to determine what data is availa-
ble, to establish the ground rules with the contractor, and to identify any
peculiarities of the contractor's facility.
2. Phase 2; Preliminary Efforts
Once the preparatory phase has been completed, the full team assem-
bles at the plant and begins an orientation and planning period. The first
step in this phase is orientation briefings, held to acquaint the team with
the contractor's operations, management systems, control procedures, and the
locations of sources of data. These briefings are normally conducted by
the contractor, Government plant personnel, and the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) . The goal of this step is for the team to get a good feel for
the overall plant operation.
The next step which consists of forming subteams and appointing subteam
leaders is usually based upon the findings of the preparatory phase and
plant orientation during which time the team leader has a good idea of the
qualifications of his team members. The subteam leaders must be assigned
strictly on the basis of having the best man for the right job. This is
also the point of time that all team members must be or become familiar with
sampling and interviewing techniques to ensure the maximum benefit of the
"should cost" study being undertaken.
The final step of the preliminary efforts phase involves adequate admin-
istrative planning. This involves such support requirements as the estab-
lishment of a report system, control of flow documents being furnished to
or reproduced for team members, establishment of a filing system, arrange-
ment for office equipment and supplies, and arrangements for other logistical
support for the team.
19

3. Phase 3; Fact Finding and Analysis
A very thorough and careful review of the contractor's proposal is
necessary in establishing the methodologies for the study. An initial review
should have been made prior to arrival at the plant, but additional informa-
tion may have been gained during the orientation period. A comparison of
the proposal with other proposals and related data of the contractor gives
the team members an understanding of the relative values of all data pro-
posed by the contractor.
It is almost inevitable that much of the methodology of the study will
include sampling because of the limited time available. The sampling tech-
niques must be planned so as to quantify the results (i.e., how are the
results to be related to the proposal costs). Careful planning is also re-
quired to develop task lists which are further subdivided into subtasks.
This subdivision is to ensure that every item in the cost proposal is cov-
ered, all aspects of the cost element are carefully researched, and to
encourage discussions among the team members.
Once the planning stage is completed and the subteams formed, it is
time to start gathering data; an important, but difficult task that requires
the establishment of rapid and direct access to contractor data. To do
this, the cooperation of the contractor is essential and every effort must
be made to convince the contractor selected that, in the worlds of Stolarow
(Ref. 28), "...we are wearing our 'white hats' when we schedule a 'should
cost' review, and hopefully, significant benefits can accrue to both the
Government and the contractors."
In gathering contractor furnished data, the team must decide what data
is needed, get the data from the contractor and then maintain it. The team
must constantly be prepared for attempts of the contractor to limit the
20

data made available. A ruling must be made as to what are the legitimate
limits of data that is requested by the team. Limiting the data available
must not be confused with withholding justified confidential data. In
obtaining contractor data several guidelines should be followed: (1) obtain
a list of every periodic report that the company prepares so that the team
knows what data is available; (2) request the data in writing and maintain
a "tickler file" to remind the contractor when the data is due; (3) use
one central control point to receive and control all data, and (4) maintain
a file of all data received to avoid duplicate data requests.
Throughout the data acquisition period, a free exchange of ideas between
team members and team leaders is extremely important. This can be accom-
plished through informal meetings and through written reports or journals
of the team members made available to the other team members.
The focal point of the data analysis is to specifically identify areas
where improvement is needed in the contractor's operations. Although the
methods of data collection vary, Stolarow (Ref . 28) points out ten areas
that are usually examined in a typical "should cost" study: (1) plant lay-
out, (2) labor standards, (3) material control, (4) machine loading and
utilization, (5) production scheduling, (6) make-or-buy practices, (7) sub-
contracting procedures, (8) quality control procedures, (9) indirect cost
controls and allocations, and (10) accounting and cost estimating procedures.
The exact techniques used to gather data depend on the idiosyncrasies of
the contractor and the product involved, but may include any or all of the
following:
a. Work sampling (sometimes called ratio-relay study) is an obser-
vation, at irregular time intervals, of what is actually taking place in
daily operations. This method can be used to find out how often minor job




incorporate time for these minor jobs into production standards. Since this
sampling takes place at irregular intervals, the employee doesn't have the
opportunity to dress up his performance for the study and therefore a true-
to-life situation is presented.
b. Plant layout study embraces the physical arrangement of the
industrial facilities, either in existence or proposed. The objectives of
the plant layout work include: (1) over-all integration of all factors
affecting the layout, (2) material moving a minimum distance
, (3) work
flowing through the plant, (4) all space effectively utilized, (5)
satisfaction and safety for workers, and (6) a flexible arrangement that
can be easily adjusted. An effective plant layout is an arrangement of
productive men, materials, machines, and their supporting activities that
will produce a product at a cost low enough to sell at a profit in a com-
petitive market.
c. Linear programming has become one of the most commonly used
operations research techniques and it is especially useful in situations
where there are several sources of scarce resources and where it is diffi-
cult to see how to best allocate these limited resources. Linear program-
ming is a mathematical method for selecting the most effective of many
possible solutions and, with the use of modern-day computers, the variables
which can be handled are almost limitless. To use linear programming, it
is necessary to first precisely define the problems and place the restric-
tions on the variables and then manipulations are done quantitatively and
all solutions are compared simultaneously to maximize or minimize the result
Ref. 20, pages 3-62 to 3-76 contains additional information on work
sampling techniques.




or goal. In the cast of "should cost," the goal is usually an attempt to
minimize the cost, but care must be taken in case of a buy-in.
d. Monte Carlo simulation is an attempt to imitate a business situ-
ation so that various policies can be tested and evaluated. This is a tech-
nique whereby the system and its associated possible sequences of events
are produced, usually by a computer, on a make-believe basis. This allows
the investigation of changes in systems and results without incurring the
a
costs of manipulating real systems.
Once the data has been collected and evaluated, and assuming that the
contractor adopts all the recommendations of the study team, the team devel-
ops its estimate of what the final product should cost.
4. Phase 4: Report Writing
The importance of the report cannot be over-stressed as it serves
several functions. The report, which is the summation of the various team
members' analysis and findings, serves as a tool to be used during nego-
tiations; it could serve as the vehicle for follow-up action in terms of
review and surveillance, and it can be extremely beneficial in communicat-
ing lessons learned to future study teams. Lange (Ref. 18) points out that
since "should cost" teams operate under tight schedules and with limited
resources they need ready access to the distilled experiences of previous
teams and that as time goes on and more areas of commonality are discov-
ered sufficient experience may be gained to warrant more routine and stand-
ardized approach.
Ref. 20, pages 8-287 to 8-291 further describes linear programming.
8




The format of the report must be developed early in the planning stage
and this format should be the controlling factor for the method in storing
and retrieving data. The team members should be "thinking" the report as
soon as they start fact-finding.
5. Phases 5 and 6: Preparations for and Conduct of Negotiations
Once the report writing has been completed, the team chief and
selected key team members must now prepare for negotiations. As mentioned
earlier, it is necessary to maintain continuity by having team members re-
main through negotiations. They should prepare strategies, review the
strengths and weaknesses of these strategies and anticipate the contractor's
negotiation position.
With the preparations completed, the negotiator should establish real-
istic time schedules for the negotiations and adhere to them. Since in the
past, contractors, as a general rule, didn't want the "should cost" team
in his plant and didn't fully cooperate while the study was in process, it




CHAPTER III ATTITUDES OF THOSE WHO ARE ENGAGED
IN "SHOULD COST" STUDIES
"Should cost" studies have been or are being conducted by the three major
branches of the Armed Forces, the General Accouting Office and industry.
Although the desired results and general principles of the study are basic-
ally the same, the different needs and the uniqueness of the procurements
involved have caused variations in the methods used.
A. THE NAVY
Although the Department of the Navy was the pioneer in Government
"should cost" (Pratt and Whitney Division of United Aircraft in 1967), it
has recently been criticized by GAO (Ref. 11) as having a negative attitude
toward the use of "should cost" studies. GAO supports this conclusion by
pointing out that the Army and the Air Force have each completed over 20
studies and have others underway or planned while the Navy has performed
only three studies, has none underway and none planned.
Mr. Gordon Rule (Ref. 24), a member of the Pratt and Whitney team, be-
lieves that "should cost" findings have little use in affecting the terms
and conditions of fully definitized contracts. Mr. Rule feels that "should
cost" has real application at the time of def initization of letter contracts
and fixed price incentive successive target contracts. In such cases the
contracting officer is able to unilaterally determine the final definitive
price if mutually agreeable prices cannot be negotiated. Of course, this
determination is subject to appeal under the disputes clause, but the con-
tractor is required to continue contract work until the appeal is settled.
Rear Admiral Rowland G. Freeman III, former Deputy Chief of Naval
Material (Procurement and Production) said (Ref. 9) that he thought "...it is
25

an inherent characteristic of our approach to contracting in the DOD that
we hold the contractor primarily responsible for his own efficiency." He
further stated that "...our position in the Navy is that 'should cost 1 is
just one method of pricing which is available to the contracting officer
and it is applicable only when we have reason to believe that a predomi-
nantly sole source contractor is not meeting the test of reasonable economy
and efficiency."
B. THE ARMY
The Department of the Army was the second of the Armed Services to adopt
use of the "should cost" technique and has completed over 20 studies. The
complexity of Army weapons systems normally is far less than those of the
Navy and the Army is therefore in a position to more carefully monitor the
progress of the systems that are being acquired. In 1970, the Army was
reported (Ref. 26) to have "...plans to use the 'should cost 1 approach with
every major weapons production contract for which there is no competitive
bidding..." To accomplish this, it was reported (Ref. 26) that "...the
Army is considering the use of small 'should cost' teams of six to ten
members to conduct truncated 'should cost' type analysis in support of
smaller contracts." The cost and staffing problems prohibit the applica-
tion of full-scale reviews.
whereas the Navy believes in flexibility in the application of the
"should cost" technique because of the uniqueness of each procurement, the
Army is much more regimented in their studies and has published guide books
such as the Should Cost Analysis Guide (Ref. 14) to assist team members.
The Army has a "should cost" center under its Logistics Management Center
at Fort Lee, Virginia, where it maintains a library and offers a five-day
course for prospective team members.
26

C. THE AIR FORCE
Like the Army, the Air Force is said (Ref. 26) to feel that "...'should
cost' reviews involve an integrated team approach to intensify and coordinate
the otherwise sequential or simultaneous but separate reviews of individual
functional disciplines such as pricing, audit, contract administration, and
technical. They will normally be conducted on a plant-wide basis and will
expressly challenge historical costs." Being the last of the services to
adopt "should cost," the Air Force had the advantage of observing the tech-
niques of the Army and the Navy and decide upon which approach that it would
pursue; the Air Force approach is very similar to that of the Army.
The "should cost" effort of the Air Force is organized and managed by
the procuring activity and the effort is directed toward the evaluation of
n
a particular proposal on a major project. The major benefit is the estab-
lishment of a negotiation objective. Although the Air Force supplement to
the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) states that "should cost"
is to be conducted only when individual cost analysis techniques seem in-
adequate, it also says that the decision not to employ "should cost" must
be justified in sole source Determinations and Findings; there is no require-
ment to justify the decision to use "should cost" despite the expense and
effort involved.
D. THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
GAO entered the "should cost" picture when it was asked by the Joint
Economic Committee, through its Subcommittee on Economy in Government, to
study the feasibility of applying "should cost" analysis in its audits and
reviews of Government procurement. GAO reviews have a different emphasis
than those of the executive agencies in that GAO is primarily concerned with
evaluating the results of the performance of the procuring activites. Since
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GAO uses "should cost" as a monitoring device, its studies are normally con-
ducted in a post-award environment.
In its report on the feasibility of "should cost" (Ref. 34), GAO said
that although "should cost" can be applied either during prenegotiation
or postnegotiation, it believes that the most effective use would be obtained
before the award of a contract. This allows maximum effectiveness in assist-
ing the Government negotiator in awarding a fair and reasonable contract and,
more importantly, a contractor would be more likely to accept the study find-
ings and to implement corrective procedures. GAO also believes that the
Government agencies should employ a capability to perform selective "should
cost" reviews to accomplish the objectives of negotiating a fair and reason-
able price, establishing specific definitions of the scope of work, and con-
ducting thorough, well coordinated negotiations.
E. INDUSTRY
As reported by GAO (Ref. 34), various industry officials have said that
the use of "should cost" concepts during the procurement process helps to
ensure a fair and reasonable price for the item being purchased. This in
no way can be interpreted that industry is in favor of the Government con-
ducting "should cost" as is pointed out by the Commission of Government
Procurement (Ref. 6) that "with a few exceptions, contractors who have
been through a (Government) 'should cost' review state that the savings
realized as a result of the review have been overstated by the Government
and that many achievements claimed by a 'should cost' team give an impre-
cise picture of the true accomplishments of the team."
Mr. W. P. Gwinn, Chairman of United Aircraft Corporation, points out
(Ref. 13) that "the 'should cost' technique is an extremely useful tool for
studying and improving the efficiency of any manufacturing business," but
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he cautions that "when the aim of a 'should cost' study fixes on current
pricing, the contractor's personnel, for very obvious and very human rea-
sons, become defensive, and at the same time the Government negotiator, in
striving to reach a cost-production goal, even if only self-imposed, can for
equally obvious and equally human reasons, very easily lose his objectivity.
Under these circumstances, the atmosphere is not conducive to the kind of
dialogue which, in the long run, could be of great benefit to both, and
ultimately to the entire defense-industry relationship."
F. SUMMARY OF ATTITUDES
The Navy feels that the application of "should cost" techniques is
very limited and is therefore oriented toward selective major projects. The
Army and the Air Force share the same philosophy and believe in conducting
"should cost" on a much wider basis than the Navy. GAO's main concern is
to evaluate the effectiveness of the Armed Services and uses "should cost"
after the award of the contract. While not being opposed to the concept,
industry is against the use of Government studies.
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CHAPTER IV SUMMATION OF DATA
The sources of data are literary research and information gained through
interviews. Literary sources included recent periodical articles, papers
presented by individuals directly involved with procurement policy and re-
buttals to this policy, studies conducted on various aspects of the "should
cost" concept, and previous theses on the subject. Informal interviews were
conducted in the interviewees' offices to establish a face-to-face relation-
ship and encourage a free exchanges of ideas. The people interviewed ex-
pressed their own opinions, not necessarily that of their company, and some,
therefore, desire to remain anonymous. With this in mind, no individual or
company names will be mentioned in the presentation of data. Because of
geographical limitations, time constraints, and the current energy crisis,
the number of interviews is small. It is realized that a limited number of
interviews has weaknesses, but those interviewed represented contractors
that rated in the top 100 of Navy suppliers and the data gained is believed
to be representative of major industries.
To better understand the responses of those interviewed, a brief expla-
nation of the economic and political atmosphere is in order. The interviews
were conducted during January, February, and March, 1974, a time when infla-
tion was rampant and a great deal of political uncertainty was present. DOD
continued to be under fire concerning its procurement practice during the
period of time that the interviews were conducted.
A. INDUSTRY'S FEELINGS TOWARD GOVERNMENT "SHOULD COST" STUDIES
Government "should cost" studies are not well received by industry.
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The majority of those interviewed feel that the concepts of "should cost"
are excellent and equivalent techniques are used in the course of normal
operations or their companies would not succeed. One individual interviewed
claimed that his company frequently forms internally staffed teams consist-
ing of members with management capabilities to conduct studies in departments
other than their own. The purpose behind this is that someone can walk into
an area and see something wrong that has been overlooked by those who work
there. Another contractor admits that they have a "do better" team similar
in operation to that of a "should cost" team.
As to the application of Government studies, one interviewee says that
he "feels fear" that the team will tell the company to do something that, in
their judgement, may be "detrimental to the best interest of the program."
It is claimed that industry is looking at the long range and may take a
profit loss now so that the project moves on. While industry is looking at
the long run, it feels that the Government "should cost" team is looking
only at the short run and, therefore, may endanger the program. In addition
some interviewees expressed concern that the team doesn't understand the
modern technology and, therefore, the whole purpose of the study is
suboptimized.
Simply stated, industry agrees with the "should cost" concept, but not
with the application by the Government.
B. TEAM SIZE AND COMPOSITION
If Government "should cost" studies are to be imposed upon industry,
small teams made up of independent members are preferred.
It is generally agreed that the team should consist of independent con-
sultants and thereby remove any parochialism that would exist had the team
been made up of personnel from the activity responsible for the procurement.
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More cooperation between the team and the contractor would be gained if the
contractor were fairly sure that the team was completely objective.
The team size desired by industry favors the approach of the Army and
the Air Force. The main reason given for favoring small teams is that large
teams cause the contractor to respond and this administrative burden "drives
the overhead out of sight." No mention was made of the fact that small
teams are easier to manipulate than are large teams, but a large team does
not insure that manipulation will not take place.
In summary, small teams made up of independent members are preferred by
industry.
C. FLEXIBILITY VERSUS STANDARDIZATION OF APPROACH
No consensus was expressed by those interviewed as to whether industry
desires firm or flexible guidelines for the application of "should cost."
Those favoring firm guidelines used the argument that they didn't know
what to expect before the team's arrival at the plant. Those favoring flex-
ibility feel that "every contractor and program are unique and firm guide-
lines tend to submerge this uniqueness."
D. METHODS OF MOTIVATING GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS TO BE MORE EFFICIENT
"Profit is strong within the contractor."
Few will deny that profit (in the long run) is foremost the minds
of every contractor, but most argue that they are also highly concerned with
the quality of their product. One individual interviewed said that he wants
a "fair price and risk factor" and a profit potential which is gained or
lost based on performance. There are several possible methods of using
profit to motivate the contractor to conduct his own study. One method
might be to grant a higher fee percentage (within the statutory limits) for
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a contractor who has conducted a "should cost" study and this percentage
based on how recently the study was made. Another method would be sharing
the cost and benefits of the study. The exact share ratio is not suggested,
but it should have some relationship to the percentage of Government busi-
ness that the contractor performs. Another method might be to make "should
cost" a below-the-line item in the weighted guidelines where the more recent
the study the higher the rating. The last method to be discussed is sug-
gested by Mr. W. P. Gwinn (Ref. 13) that "the Government could encourage
this continuing self-examination and improvement by reviewing contractors'
capabilities and procedures for the internal application of the 'should
cost' technique, and the contractors' utilization of the technique, and by
withholding any 'should cost' studies by the Government upon a finding that
the contractors' capabilities in this field were adequate."
E. DESIGN-TO-COST
The concept of design-to-cost shows a great deal of promise in the pro-
curement process and is being enthusiastically received by industry.
Although it was not intended, the subject of design-to-cost came up in
numerous interviews. Most contractors seem to be highly in favor of this
technique and feel that much more can be accomplished through this concept
than through the application of "should cost." It should be brought out
that every "should cost" doesn't necessarily involve design-to-cost, but
every design-to-cost effort should involve "should cost." As identified
by James McCullough (Ref. 21), the birth of design-to-cost within DOD was
was manifested in DOD Directive 5000.1, Acquisition of Major Systems, dated
July 13, 1971, which states:
Cost parameters shall be established which consider the cost of
acquisition and ownership; discrete cost elements (e.g., unit
production cost, operating and support cost) shall be translated
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into "design to" requirements. System development shall be con-
tinuously evaluated against these requirements with the same rigor
as that applied to technical requirements. Practical tradeoffs
shall be made between system capability, cost and schedule.
McCullough describes three methods of applying the design-to-cost concept:
(1) as it relates to the total system (far beyond the "should cost" con-
cept) which requires action taken during the design phase using life-cycle
costs as a key design parameter; (2) focus on production hardware ("should
cost" is relevant) which seems to be the current actual practice, and (3)
the total force structure (again far beyond the "should cost" concept)
which suggests that strategies are established to meet future threats using
the budget as the constraining factor and a mixture of smaller, high-tech-
nology force to meet similar threats and a larger, standard force of lower-
cost weapons be designed to meet these future threats.
34

CHAPTER V SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The purpose of a "should cost" team is to review the contractor's cost
projections and to identify where these projections include the cost pre-
sumptions of past inefficient and uneconomical performance and management
practices and to recommend methods of improving efficiency and, thereby,
reducing cost. The findings of the study form the base for contract nego-
tiations and/or evaluation of past performance. The negotiated contract
price should only reflect those changes which can be put into effect imme-
diately. The full benefit of the study by the Government can only be derived
from future business with the contractor.
The use of the "should cost" concept must be limited to high dollar major
systems because of the expense of deploying a team of highly skilled special-
ists to the contractor's plant for a long period of time. The cost of the
study must also consider various impact costs: the contractor's impact
costs incurred by the disruption of his normal operations and the cost in-
curred by the Government for having to find and train personnel to replace
the specialists selected for the team when Government personnel are being
utilized.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The objectives and policy of "should cost" be standardized, but not
the application .
Industry feels, as pointed out by the Commission on Government Procure-
ment (Ref. 6), that the absence of formal, common, and consistent standards
of the Government's "should cost" policy and procedure contributes to
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contractors' lack of understanding and apprehensions regarding the concept.
Application of the concept must be tailored to the situation, but a uniform
objectives and policy statement is possible.
2. "Should cost" should not be used during the early stages of the
system life cycle .
"Should cost" is just one method of pricing and has limited appli-
cation with regard to Government contractors. As with any cost estimating
procedure, its accuracy is highly dependent on the degree of certainty of
quantity, performance, and schedule. In this respect, "should cost" has
little or no applicability during the early stages of the system life cycle
and is best suited for the case of follow-on production. Although "should
cost" can be applied either before or after contract negotiation, maximum
benefit is gained by application prior to contract award.
3. A study (possibly a follow-on thesis) be conducted to determine the
feasibility of employing a preliminary "should cost" review to determine if
sufficient potential cost savings merit extensive "should cost" expense .
As recommended by the Commission on Government Procurement (Ref. 6),
when there is any doubt as to whether a "should cost" study is justified,
a great deal of time and effort can be saved by sending a small team, select-
ed on the basis of their industrial engineering and management capabilities,
to the plant to decide in a relatively short time and with minimum disrup-
tion if the contractor's situation is serious enough to warrant a full
"should cost" review.
4. A study be conducted as to what is the most effective team size
and composition
.
Government "should cost" studies have involved from six to 40 team
members and the most effective team size is unknown. It is realized that
an exact number would depend on many aspects of the study in question,
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but some determination of whether the team should be large or small is
needed
.
Although industry is in favor of teams made up of independent consult-
ants, an argument is that Government representatives most familiar with a
contractor's everyday activities (Plant Cognizance Program) can usually
perform the most effective "should cost" review. It seems apparent that
a mix of Government personnel and independent consultants is necessary to
get the continuity and objectivity needed, but this mix is not known.
5. "Should cost" studies conducted by the contractor be included as
a below the line factor in the weighted guidelines .
As explained by ASPR, weighted guidelines is a technique that will
insure consideration of the relative value of the pertinent profit factors
in the establishment of a profit objective and the conduct of negotiations.
"Should cost" could be included as a special profit factor with a weight
factor equal to that of contractor performance. Thus, the weighted guide-
lines would be used to guarantee a contractor a higher profit factor if he
took it upon himself to conduct a "should cost" study.
6. Automatic data processing techniques be used to link together
"should cost" and value engineering concepts .
As pointed out by Frank (Ref. 8), value engineering (product cost
reduction activities) and "should cost" techniques can be administratively
linked together with automatic data processing techniques to reduce the
likelihood of unwarranted program cost growth. This concept further rein-
forces the concept that "should cost" is highly product oriented, but is in
contradiction with the idea that maximum benefit is gained by application
prior to contract award. Automatic data processing is also useful in moni-
toring contract progress. Automatic data processing allows for simulation
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of an on-going program to help the Government and the contractor to better
understand the cost ramifications of program decisions before it is neces-
sary to put these decisions into effect.
7. Investigate the feasibility of the design-to-cost concept to fulfill
"should cost" objectives .
One of the tasks of the Commission on Government Procurement (Ref. 6)
was to focus attention on areas where illusion and gamesmanship had crept
into the procurement process. The "should cost" process was identified as
showing signs of becoming another game, thus defeating its potential as a
useful method of cost estimating. Once a process becomes a game it becomes
time to "get on with" the job to be done and this may require new methods.
Design-to-cost has a great deal of promise for Government procurement and
is being enthusiastically received by industry.
C. CLOSING STATEMENT
The overall goal of the Defense procurement system is to optimize de-
fense for the taxpayer's limited dollars. To insure that cost is a manage-
able item, it is first necessary to have the right procurement system and
to rely heavily on competition. There is no one pricing technique which
suits every procurement situation and care must be taken to insure that the
method of cost estimating is appropriate for the procurement at hand,
whatever the costing techniques used, it must be exercised to insure that
the findings lead to a realistic basis for negotiation; undue optimism can
lead to goals that are unrealistic, and, if accepted by the contractor,





QUESTIONS USED DURING INTERVIEWS TO STIMULATE A FREE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS
1. What is your attitude toward "should cost" as a pricing policy?
2. What is your company's attitude toward "should cost" as a pricing
policy?
3. When, if at all, do you feel that the "should cost" technique is
appropriate?
4. Do you or your company feel any resentment toward Government "should
cost" analysis?
5. Do you favor flexibility in the application of "should cost" or would
you like to see uniform guidelines to be used by all Government agencies?
6. What do you feel that the Government can do to motive you, your company
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